This paper proposes a reassessment of the telos formula attributed to Critolaus by doxographic reports in Clement and Stobaeus. Its peculiar terminology of “composition” (συμπληρούμενον, literally “co-filled”) is commonly understood as designed to answer the kind of substantive question about the human good that generates the schematic “divisions” associated most famously with Carneades, namely, by specifying what the basis or essence or nature of eudaimonia is. I argue that the formula serves instead to answer a more formal question about the nature of the telos itself as an ultimate end: Critolaus characterizes the telos as necessarily composite. I suggest he also asserts a distinctly Aristotelian form of holism that conceives virtuous activity as an integrated interaction in which three thoroughly compatible but fundamentally distinct kinds of good each play their proper parts, precisely as “proper parts” of the integrated wholes they compose.